

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00405 01 OF 03 251144Z

41

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ACDE-00 ISO-00 EB-07 ERDE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00

EUR-12 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01

PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

TRSE-00 NSC-05 /095 W

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P R 251100Z JUL 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1181

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0405

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: POSSIBLE WESTERN TACTICS ON THE DEFINITIONS  
AND DATA ISSUE

1. WHEN THE VIENNA TALKS RESUME IN SEPTEMBER, THE ALLIES  
WILL HAVE TO HAVE AN AGREED POSITION ON THE ISSUE OF  
FORCE DEFINITIONS AND ON THE RELATED ISSUE OF THE TACTICS  
OF BRINGING THE EAST INTO A DISCUSSION OF DATA.

2. SEVERAL FACTORS MAKE THIS NECESSARY. THE EAST  
HAS MADE A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL FOR DEFINING GROUND AND  
AIR FORCES. THIS PROPOSAL IS ON THE TABLE, AND THE  
ALLIES WILL NEED TO DEAL WITH IT. FURTHER, THE DEFINITIONS  
ISSUE HAS AN OBVIOUS RELATIONSHIP TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF  
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00405 01 OF 03 251144Z

A COMMON CEILING TO COVER AIR MANPOWER. FOR THIS

REASON ALONE, THE ALLIES WILL NEED A POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT.

2. IN BROAD TERMS, WE SEE TWO ALTERNATIVE COURSES:

(A) UNDER COURSE ONE, THE ALLIES WOULD, SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION OF THEIR DATA ESTIMATES, ESTABLISH AN EXPLICIT POSITION ON A FORCE DEFINITION WHICH WOULD ALLOCATE ALL FORCES IN THE AREA TO GROUND OR AIR BY THE TIME OF THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT NEGOTIATING ROUND. THEY WOULD BUILD THIS DEFINITIONAL APPROACH ( INCLUDING THE FULL DRAFT TEXT OF A DEFINITION ) INTO THE OVERALL ALLIED REDUCTION PROGRAM SO THAT IT WOULD FORM A PART OF THE PRESENTATION OF OPTION 3 TO THE EAST. THE ALLIES WOULD RESERVE A FINAL DECISION ON THEIR DEFINITIONAL APPROACH UNTIL AFTER DATA HAD BEEN EXCHANGED, AND THE IMPLICATIONS IN NUMERICAL TERMS OF ANY RE-CATEGORIZATION WERE CLEAR.

(B) UNDER COURSE TWO, THE ALLIES WOULD MAKE NO DECISION ON THE DEFINITIONS ISSUE AT THIS TIME AND WOULD SEEK DELIBERATELY TO POSTPONE SOLUTION OF THE ISSUE TO A LATER STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, ATTEMPTING FIRST TO BRING THE EAST INTO A DATA DISCUSSION AND ONLY SUBSEQUENTLY RETURNING TO THE DEFINITION ISSUE.

3. THE IMPLICATIONS OF BOTH OF THESE COURSES ARE EXAMINED BELOW. THIS MESSAGE MAKES NO RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO WHICH SHOULD BE ADOPTED. SINCE WE BELIEVE THE ISSUE CANNOT BE AVOIDED IN THE FALL ROUND OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WE RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON AGENCIES CONSIDER THESE TWO ALTERNATIVES AND PROPOSE A DEFINITE COURSE FOR ALLIED CONSIDERATION IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSION OF OPTION 3.

4. COURSE ONE. UNDER COURSE ONE, THE ALLIES WOULD, SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION OF THEIR DATA ESTIMATES, TAKE AN EXPLICIT POSITION AS TO WHICH FORCE CATEGORY (GROUND OR AIR) THE FORCE ELEMENTS WHOSE TREATMENT UNDER THE WESTERN DEFINITION HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED BY THE EAST

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00405 01 OF 03 251144Z

AS ANOMALOUS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO. THESE FORCE ELEMENTS ARE: SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE PERSONNEL, HELICOPTER PERSONNEL, AND GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL.

5. IN THE LAST ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS, THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE PUT FORWARD THE PRINCIPLE THAT LIKE FORCES SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE SAME FORCE CATEGORY,

GROUND OR AIR. USING THIS PRINCIPLE, THERE APPEAR TO BE TWO MAJOR POSSIBILITIES FOR RECATEGORIZING THE FORCE ELEMENTS IN QUESTION.

6. THE FIRST POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO FOLLOW THIS PRINCIPLE IN THE MANNER KHLESTOV HAS SAID IT SHOULD BE APPLIED. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT:

(A) THE 42,000 POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK GROUND-BASED TERRITORIAL AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL (NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND PERSONNEL) NOW INCLUDED IN NATO'S GROUND FORCE FIGURES WOULD BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE GROUND FORCES TO THE AIR FORCES. ALL OTHER AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL WOULD REMAIN AS NATO HAS CATEGORIZED THEM (EITHER IN THE GROUND FORCES OR THE AIR FORCES).

(B) ALL HELICOPTER PERSONNEL WOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE GROUND FORCES (WITH POSSIBLY SOME MINOR EXCEPTIONS). THIS WOULD INVOLVE THE TRANSFER OF SOME 2,000 NATO HELICOPTER PERSONNEL AND SOME 18,000 WARSAW PACT PERSONNEL NOW INCLUDED IN WESTERN AIR FORCE FIGURES FROM THE AIR FORCES TO THE GROUND FORCES.

(C) ALL SSM PERSONNEL WOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE GROUND FORCES. THIS WOULD INVOLVE THE TRANSFER OF SOME 4,000 FRG PERSHING PERSONNEL NOW INCLUDED IN THE NATO AIR FORCE TOTAL FROM THE AIR FORCE TO THE GROUND FORCE.

7. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THESE CHANGES WOULD BE TO SUBTRACT 6,000 PERSONNEL FROM THE NATO AIR FORCE TOTAL AND ADD THEM TO THE NATO GROUND FORCE TOTAL, AND TO SUBTRACT 24,000 PERSONNEL FROM THE WARSAW PACT GROUND  
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SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00405 01 OF 03 251144Z

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00405 02 OF 03 251156Z

41  
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ACDE-00 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-02

INR-07 IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03

PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00

NSC-05 EB-07 ERDE-00 /095 W

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P R 251100Z JUL 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1182

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0405

FROM US REP MBFR

FORCE TOTAL AND ADD THEM TO THE WARSAW PACT AIR  
FORCE TOTAL. THIS WOULD RESULT IN A NET SHIFT IN  
THE PERSONNEL DISPARITY FROM GROUND TO AIR OF  
30,000 (I.E., THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY WOULD BE  
DECREASED BY 30,000, WHILE THE AIR FORCE DISPARITY  
WOULD BE INCREASED BY THE SAME AMOUNT).

8. THE SECOND MAJOR WAY OF APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE  
THAT LIKE FORCES SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE SAME  
FORCE CATEGORIES (GROUND OR AIR) WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) ALL GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL WOULD  
BE ASSIGNED TO THE GROUND FORCES AND INCLUDED IN THE  
GROUND TOTALS. THIS WOULD INVOLVE A SHIFT OF SOME  
29,000 NATO PERSONNEL AND SOME 11,000 GDR NATIONAL AIR  
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00405 02 OF 03 251156Z

DEFENSE FROM AIR FORCES TO GROUND FORCES.

(B) ALL HELICOPTER PERSONNL WOULD BE ASSIGNED TO  
THE GROUND FORCES AND INCLUDED IN THE GROUND FORCE  
TOTALS. THIS WOULD INVOLVE A SHIFT OF SOME 2,000 NATO  
PERSONNEL AND SOME 18,000 WARSAW PACT PERSONNEL FROM  
AIR TO GROUND FORCES.

(C) ALL SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE PERSONNEL WOULD

BE ASSIGNED TO GROUND FORCES. THIS WOULD INVOLVE A SHIFT OF SOME 4,000 FRG PERSHING PERSONNEL FROM THE AIR FORCE TO THE GROUND FORCE.

9. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THESE CHANGES WOULD BE TO SUBTRACT 35,000 NATO PERSONNEL AND 29,000 WARSAW PACT PERSONNEL FROM THE AIR FORCE TOTALS AND ADD THEM TO THE GROUND FORCE TOTALS. THIS WOULD RESULT IN A NET SHIFT IN THE PERSONNEL DISPARITY FROM GROUND TO AIR OF 6,000 (I.E., THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY WOULD BE DECREASED BY 6,000, WHILE THE AIR FORCE DISPARITY WOULD BE INCREASED BY THIS SAME AMOUNT).

10. BOTH OF THE POSSIBILITIES OUTLINED IN PARAS 6 TO 9 ABOVE WOULD RESULT IN A SITUATION IN WHICH THE EAST'S PRESENT NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN AIR MANPOWER (6,000-12,000) WOULD BE INCREASED. IF THE ALLIES AGREE ON THE 099,000-MAN COMMON CEILING AND THE WEST CONTINUED TO REFUSE TO REDUCE AIR MANPOWER, THEN, IN ORDER TO REACH THE 900,000 LEVEL, THE EAST WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE ITS GROUND FORCES TO A LEVEL BELOW THAT OF THE WEST. SUCH AN OUTCOME WOULD NOT BE IN CONFORMITY WITH ALLIED INSISTENCE THAT GROUND FORCE PARITY IS THE BEST ASSURANCE OF STABILITY AND THE EAST WOULD OPPOSE IT ON THESE GROUNDS AMONG OTHERS.

11. TO REMOVE THIS OBSTACLE TO EASTERN AGREEMENT, BOTH THESE POSSIBILITIES PROBABLY WOULD ENTAIL ALLIED AGREEMENT TO PERMIT THE EAST TO TAKE A LIMITED NUMBER OF AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS. IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO GAIN FRG AGREEMENT TO THIS POINT AT A TIME WHEN THE ALLIES ARE DISCUSSING THE POSSIBILITY  
SECRET

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00405 02 OF 03 251156Z

OF PUTTING FORWARD OPTION 3.

12. TO HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE POSITION IN THIS FIELD, THE ALLIES WOULD ALSO HAVE TO RESOLVE THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY OVER SUB-CEILINGS ON GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER WITHIN THE COMMON CEILING.

13. THESE DIFFICULTIES MAKE IT SOMEWHAT DOUBTFUL, IN OUR VIEW, WHETHER THE ALLIES COULD REACH PROMPT AGREEMENT ON COURSE ONE, NO MATTER WHICH VARIANT WERE PREFERRED.

14. COURSE TWO. UNDER COURSE TWO, THE ALLIES WOULD POSTPONE DECISION ON ALLOCATION OF FORCE ELEMENTS TO GROUND OR AIR UNTIL AFTER SOME EAST-WEST DISCUSSION OF DATA HAD TAKEN PLACE. UNDER THIS COURSE, THE ALLIES COULD STILL PROPOSE EXTENDING THE COMMON CEILING TO

COVER AIR FORCE MANPOWER, MAINTAINING THE POSITION THAT THEY WOULD NOT TAKE ANY REDUCTIONS IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER. AS WILL BE SEEN BELOW, ADOPTION OF THIS COURSE WOULD ALSO ENABLE POSTPONEMENT OF A FINAL ALLIED DECISION ON SUB-CEILINGS FOR GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER WITHIN THE COMMON CEILING.

15. WITH REGARD TO TACTICAL TREATMENT WITH THE EAST OF THIS APPROACH, THE FOLLOWING POINTS MIGHT BE CONSIDERED:

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00405 03 OF 03 251205Z

41

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ACDE-00 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-02

INR-07 IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03

PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00

NSC-05 EB-07 ERDE-00 /095 W

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P R 251100Z JUL 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0405

FROM US REP MBFR

A. THE WEST WOULD TAKE THE POSITION WITH THE EAST THAT THE WEST IS NOT PREPARED TO AGREE TO CHANGES IN FORCE CATEGORIZATION UNTIL THE EAST HAS MADE DATA AVAILABLE WHICH WOULD ENABLE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE EFFECTS OF THE SUGGESTED CHANGES.

B. THE WEST WOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK TO MOVE TO DATA EXCHANGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

C. ASSUMING THAT THE EAST WILL AGREE TO DATA EXCHANGE AFTER OPTION 3 IS TABLED, THE WEST SHOULD FIRST AIM AT DISCUSSION OF THE OVERALL MANPOWER TOTALS FOR EACH SIDE, AND SEEK TO CLARIFY THE REASONS FOR PROBABLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM.

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SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00405 03 OF 03 251205Z

D. EACH SIDE WOULD TABLE THE OVERALL TOTALS FOR GROUND AND AIR FORCES, EACH DIVIDING THE TWO AS IT SAW FIT. BUT THE WEST WOULD GIVE PRIORITY IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION TO THE OVERALL TOTALS OF COMBINED GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER AND TO CLARIFYING THE REASONS FOR DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THESE OVERALL TOTALS. DIVIDING THE TOTAL FORCES OF EACH SIDE BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR ON AN AGREED BASIS CAN BE POSTPONED UNTIL THE OVERALL TOTALS HAD BEEN AGREED.

3. IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT DATA EXCHANGE, IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE FOR THE WEST TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO TABLE ITS COMBINED TOTALS. IT COULD DO THIS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF ILLUSTRATING ITS NEW COMMON CEILING PROPOSAL. THE WEST, IN SUGGESTING AN ILLUSTRATIVE COMBINED GROUND AND AIR FORCE CEILING AT 900,000 MEN WOULD ALREADY HAVE SIGNALLED ITS ASSESSMENT OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER.

F. THE WEST SHOULD CONTEST POSSIBLE EASTERN EFFORTS TO INCREASE THE OVERALL TOTAL OF WESTERN FORCES OR TO DECREASE THE OVERALL TOTAL OF EASTERN FORCES.

G. THE WEST SHOULD PROPOSE FURTHER DATA COMPARISON APPROPRIATE FOR THE PURPOSE OF CLARIFYING THE REASONS FOR ANY DIFFERENCES.

16. IF, AT THE OUTSET OF THE DISCUSSION, THE EAST INSISTS THAT FINAL AGREEMENT ON DEFINITIONS BE REACHED BEFORE DATA IS EXCHANGED, THE WEST SHOULD DECLINE TO REACH FINAL AGREEMENT ON DEFINITIONS UNTIL THE NUMERICAL EFFECTS OF POSSIBLE CHANGES CAN BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD. BUT, IF IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN MOVING THE EAST TOWARD DATA EXCHANGE, THE WEST COULD SEEK TO AGREE WITH THE EAST ON THE GOALS OF A DEFINITION.

17. THE FIRST TWO GOALS SHOULD BE AS SET FORTH BY WESTERN REPS IN THE INFORMAL SESSION OF JULY 15.

IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE EAST WILL REFUSE TO  
AGREE TO A DEFINITION WHICH EXCLUDES ALL RESERVES,  
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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00405 03 OF 03 251205Z

INCLUDING THE FRG READY RESERVE. IF SO, THIS  
WOULD PROVIDE A GROUND FOR POSTPONING THE EFFORT  
TO REACH FINAL AGREEMENT ON A DEFINITION AND TO  
MOVE ON TO DATA EXCHANGE.

18. THE THIRD GOAL COULD BE PHRASED ALONG THE  
FOLLOWING LINES: AS REGARDS THE THREE TYPES OF  
FORCES RAISED BY THE EAST (GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE,  
HELICOPTER, AND SSM PERSONNEL), THE WEST CAN AGREE  
TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE SAME TYPE OF FORCES SHOULD  
BE ASSIGNED TO THE SAME FORCE CATEGORY, EITHER GROUND  
OR AIR FORCES. BUT WESTERN AGREEMENT TO THIS PRINCIPLE  
IN THESE THREE CASES DOES NOT CONNOTE ANY WESTERN  
AGREEMENT AS TO SPECIFIC DISPOSITION OF THESE CASES.  
WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD NOTE THE POINT MADE BY  
THE SOVIET REP THAT, AS LONG AS THE PRINCIPLE OF LIKE  
FORCES IN THE LIKE CATEGORY IS OBSERVED, IT DOES NOT  
MATTER WHICH FORCE CATEGORY, AIR OR GROUND, THE DISPUTED  
FORCES MIGHT BE ASSIGNED TO. THE WEST WOULD NOT  
NECESSAIRILY APPLY THE PRINCIPLE OF ASSIGNING LIKE FORCES  
TO LIKE CATEGORIES IN THE SAME WAY AS EASTERN  
REPRESENTATIVES HAVE PROPOSED.

19. A WESTERN POSITION OF THIS KIND WOULD RETAIN  
WESTERN FLEXIBILITY TO DECIDE LATER ON ALLOCATION  
OF THE DISPUTED CATEGORIES AS BETWEEN THE TWO  
POSSIBILITIES DESCRIBED EARLIER.

20. THE WEST WOULD THEN PRESS FOR DATA EXCHANGE AS  
DISCUSSED ABOVE.

21. IF THE ALLIANCE ACCEPTS THE FRG IDEA THAT, AS  
AN ALTERNATIVE TO SPECIFYING THE NUMERICAL LEVEL OF  
THE COMMON CEILING IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT, THE ALLIES  
COULD INSTEAD OBTAIN EASTERN AGREEMENT TO SPECIFY THE  
OVERALL RESIDUAL MANPOWER LEVELS ON BOTH SIDES, THE  
NEED FOR EARLY DATA EXCHANGE WOULD BE INCREASED.  
ONE POSSIBLE WAY OF REFLECTING THIS SITUATION WOULD  
BE TO INCLUDE A SENTENCE IN THE NAC GUIDANCE ON OPTION 3  
TO THE EFFECT THAT THE WEST EXPECTED THAT PUTTING  
FORWARD THE WESTERN NUCLEAR OFFER WOULD QUITE NATURALLY  
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PAGE 04 MBFR V 00405 03 OF 03 251205Z

RESULT IN EASTERN AGREEMENT TO EXCHANGE DATA.RESOR

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** ARMED FORCES, DATA, MILITARY PERSONNEL, AIR FORCE, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 25 JUL 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975MBFRV00405  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750257-0360  
**From:** MBFR VIENNA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19750722/aaaaatij.tel  
**Line Count:** 441  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 9  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 03 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <03 APR 2003 by Izenbel0>; APPROVED <09 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR: POSSIBLE WESTERN TACTICS ON THE DEFINITIONS AND DATA ISSUE  
**TAGS:** PARM, NATO, MBFR  
**To:** STATE DOD  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006